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Abstract 
This paper determines the causal link between FDI and corruption in 42 developing countries using linear and non 
linear panel Granger causal methods over the period 1998 to 2009. The findings show that the outcome of the causal 
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bidirectional causal link between FDI and corruption while in contrast, for the nonlinear tests, the link from FDI to 
corruption dominates.
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1.  Introduction 
The  growing  literature  on  the  relationship  between  corruption  and  foreign  direct  investment 
(FDI) inflows suggests that corruption can have either a negative or positive effect on FDI (see 
the survey of Campos  et al., 2010). Treating corruption as a  factor that affects the costs of 
investment operations, Bardhan (1997) argued that foreign investors would have to pay extra 
costs in the form of bribes to get licenses or government permits to conduct business and such 
additional costs would decrease the expected profitability of investment. Moreover, corruption 
increases uncertainty because corruption agreements are not enforceable in the courts of law.  
Therefore,  foreign  investors  would  tend  to  avoid  investing  in  countries  with  high  levels  of 
corruption. However, a positive impact of corruption on FDI inflows could exist. In the presence 
of  stiff  regulations  and  an  inefficient  bureaucracy,  corruption  may  augment  bureaucratic 
efficiency  by  accelerating  the  process  of  decision  making  (Bardhan,  1997). Empirically,  the 
evidence on the effects of corruption on FDI flows has been mixed but most studies have not 
found the commonly expected conclusion that a high level of corruption deters FDI (Campos et 
al., 2010). Some empirical papers provide support of a negative link between corruption and 
FDI, while others fail to find any significant relationship. However, what has been omitted from 
this literature is research that allows for the possibility that FDI inflows can cause corruption 
activities  rather  than  the  other  way  around  so  that  corruption  may  not  necessarily  be  an 
independent  variable.    In  fact  corruption  is  a  consequence  of  economic  and  non-economic 
variables  and  so  should  be  treated  as  an  endogenous  variable.  For  instance,  FDI  can  create 
additional resources which permit a country to fight corruption effectively. On the other hand, if 
more FDI inflows represent a richer economy this can also raise the probability of individuals 
getting involve in corruptive activities. 
 
It seems therefore that the  causal pattern between corruption and  FDI cannot be determined 
theoretically and an empirical analysis is required to resolve this issue.  It should be noted that 
the previous empirical  examinations done on this nexus regressed corruption on FDI, which 
implicitly posits that corruption is exogenous to the model; no analysis allowed for corruption 
and FDI to be endogenous and simultaneously determined. By undertaking formal causality tests 
this note hopes to rectify this deficiency in the literature. 
 
Employing a set of 42 countries covering the period 1998 to 2009 this study assesses for the first 
time  the  relationship  between  corruption  and  FDI  utilizing  both  linear  and  nonlinear  panel 
granger causality tests. Linear panel causality methods are increasingly becoming quite popular 
in  economic  applications  (see  Hurlin  and  Venet,  2001;  Hurlin,  2004;  Craigwell  and  Moore, 
2008; Greenidge et al., 2010). However, few examples appear in the economic literature that 
uses non-linear panel causality tests. The complex nature of FDI and corruption which depend on 
several economic and non-economic indicators imply that the former two variables could follow 
a non-linear process and it therefore appears appropriate to conduct non linearity causal tests on 
such.  
 
The plan for this paper is as follows: the causality methods are discussed in section 2, followed 
by an outline of the estimated results in section 3 and in the final section conclusions are made. 
 
 




2.  Methodology and Data 
2.1  Methodology 
This  paper  uses  the  concept  of  statistical  causation  developed  by  Granger  (1969),  where  a 
variable  X  is  said  to  Granger  cause  Y,  X  needs  to  add  value  or  make  a  significant  marginal 
contribution to the forecast of Y given past Y and past X. Hurlin and Venet (2001) and Hurlin (2004) 
applied this notion of causality to panel data by allowing the autoregressive coefficients in the 
model to be treated as constants which improve degrees of freedom leading to greater efficiency 
of the estimates. This procedure contrasts with the more popular approaches of Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988),  Weinhold  (1996)  and  Nair-Reichert  and  Weinhold  (2001)  where  the  autoregressive 
coefficients can vary and efficiency is only possible with a „large time dimension‟.  
 
2.1.1  Hurlin Panel Causality Linear Tests 
The Hurlin (2004) procedure is based on the following equation:  
   
 
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where CO represents corruption, the individual country specific coefficients are given by , the 
autoregressive and regression coefficients on lagged values of corruption and the explanatory 
variables  ( x) that  include  foreign  investment  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  (FDI) are  denoted  by 
 and , respectively,  while   is the error term with classical properties. The individual effects 
  are presumed fixed along with   and  and the lag order, k, is identical (balanced) for all 
cross-section units of the panel (Hurlin, 2004).  
 
Implementing  the  Hurlin  (2004)  panel  causality  methodology    starts  with  checking  for 
homogenous and instantaneous non-causality (HINC) which is based on a  Wald coefficient test 
that all the   s are equal to zero for all individuals i and all lags k. If the regression coefficients 
are not significantly different from zero, then the hypothesis is accepted which implies that the 
variable x is not Granger causing CO in the sample. Once the result indicates non-causality then 
there is no need for further testing (Hurlin and Venet, 2001; Hurlin, 2004; Greenidge et al., 
2010). If the null hypothesis is rejected there exists the possibility that a causal relationship for 
the variables  is  identical across all countries  in  the series (Greenidge  et al., 2010).  This  is 
referred  to  as  the  homogeneous  causality  (HC)  test  which  indicates  that  the  regression 
coefficients are not statistically different across the countries for all lags. HC is rejected if the 
Wald statistic is significant. The rejection of the HC test requires that the regression coefficients 
must be examined for any statistically significant causal relationships across differing countries. 
This heterogeneous non-causality (HENC) test is one in which the coefficients of the lagged 
variables are checked to see if all of these terms are equal to zero or statistically different. A 
Wald statistic is also done for this calculation (Hurlin and Venet, 2001; Hurlin, 2004; Greenidge 
et al., 2010). 
 
2.1.2  Harvey and Leybourne Panel Causality Non Linear Tests 
Non  linearity  causality  tests  were  first  introduced  by  Baek  and  Brock  (1992)  using 
nonparametric methods of spatial probabilities.  However, the main problem with these tests is 
that they failed to provide appropriate statistics that have similar critical values even if the data 
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being considered is a linear I(0) or I(1) process and is likewise consistent against non-linearity of 
either form (Harvey and Leybourne, 2007). Harvey and Leybourne (2007) rectified this problem 








2 2 1 1 0 ) ( ) (                 it it it it it it FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI CO           (2)   
A similar expression can be derived for  FDI CO   by interchanging CO and FDI in Equation 
(2).  The same steps that were undertaken with the Hurlin (2004) linear panel causality approach 
can then be followed.  
 
2.2  Data 
The data utilised in this paper cover the period 1998 to 2009 for forty two markets and were 
sourced from the International Monetary Fund‟s International Financial Statistics and the World 
Bank‟s  Statistics  Database.  Besides  corruption  (CO)  and  foreign  direct  investment  as  a 
percentage of GDP (FDI), the data set consists of several control variables which are augmented 
to the test equations to check the robustness of the relationship between CO and FDI. The control 
variables utilized are per capita GDP (GR) and domestic investment as a percentage of GDP 
(Invt_GDP).  These  variables  are  self-explanatory  as  they  are  often  employed  as  standard 
macroeconomic  variables  in  explaining  the  impact  of  corruption  on  per  capita  growth  (see 
Freckleton et al, 2010; Campos et al., 2010).  
 
3.  Estimated Results 
The soundness of the causality results relies on the series being stationary, using appropriate lag 
lengths and incorporating control variables that rule out the possibility of an omitted variable 
driving the causal pattern of interest (Feige and Mcgee, 1977). So this section starts by exploring 
the temporal properties of the series. The results indicate that all 4 variables are stationary in 
levels. The series are also checked for cross sectional dependence, and nonlinearity using the 
method developed by Pesaran (2007) which combines the cross averages of lagged levels and 
first differences of the series.  These findings indicate that most of the countries in the sample 
displayed linear and independence behaviour.  Note all of the above mentioned results were not 
reported  due  to  space  considerations  but  are  available  on  request.    Once  the  variables  are 
stationary and independent, the panel Granger causality tests can be conducted on the statistical 
significance of the regression coefficients using the above mentioned Wald statistics.  
 
3.1  Linear Panel Causality Results 
Two types of panel regression methods are considered; the pooled ordinary least square (OLS) 
model  and  the  fixed  effects  model.  The  pooled  OLS  model  assumes  no  variation  of  the 
coefficients and intercept terms while the fixed effects model allows for variation within each 
country intercept (Hsiao, 2003; Craigwell and Moore, 2008). The test statistics, based on the two 
panel regression methods, are given for lags 1 to 3; an F test was used to test restrictions on the 
coefficients at the chosen lag lengths which were determined by the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion 
(SBC), given the relatively small sample utilized here. 
 
The HC test results seen in Table 1 reveal a strong causal relationship from corruption to FDI, 
and a similar link from FDI to corruption. To ensure that the model in Table 1 is well specified, 
per capita GDP and domestic investments as a percentage of GDP are added as control variables. 
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These results are displayed in Table 1 and are quite revealed similar to the findings of the models 
without the controls.  
Table 1: Homogenous and Instantaneous Non-Causality Tests (No Controls and Controls) 








   
HC 
 
















FDI CO    1  34.85***  4.41***  23.76***  3.81***  8.41***  3.17*** 
  2  33.24***  4.36***  20.87***    3.52***  7.02***  2.89*** 
  3  30.71***   2.81***  17.43***  2.17**  5.99***  2.30** 
               
CO FDI    1  34.94***  4.44***  22.28***  3.24***  7.12***  2.15** 
  2  33.24***  2.62***  19.07***  2.91***  6.29***  2.08** 
  3  31.61***  3.09***  17.66***  2.04**  5.27***  1.67* 
Note: ***,** and * indicates significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
With evidence that  FDI CO  , country  specific tests of the HINC  form can  be undertaken 
(Hood  et  al.,  2008;  Craigwell  and  Moore,  2008).  Utilizing  the  HINC  tests,  the  regression 
coefficients  across  countries  are  statistically  different  from  zero  and  the  null  hypothesis  is 
rejected (Table 1).  The  HENC test is also used to determine if the  ik   coefficients are different 
across countries. Table 2 shows that the majority of the markets (27) suggest a bidirectional 
causal link between FDI and corruption, 14 indicate causality from corruption to FDI and 1 
market revealed that FDI Granger caused corruption.  
 
3.2  Non-linear Panel Causality Results 
The  non-linear  panel  causality  results  observed  in  Table  3  show  that  the  hypothesis  of 
FDI CO  is rejected contrasting with the acceptance findings that CO FDI  .  Since there is 
evidence  of  causality,  as  in  the  linear  panel  investigations, country  specific  non-linear  panel 
causal checks are made utilizing the HC and HINC tests (Table 4). In contrast to the linear tests, 
the  results  imply  that  the  majority  of  the  markets  (22)  indicate  that  FDI  Granger  caused 
corruption, 11 revealed that there was bi directional links between FDI and corruption, 4 had a 
significant non-linear causal relationship from corruption to FDI while the remaining 5 markets 









Table 2: Heterogeneous Granger Causality Tests 
Country  FDI CO    CO FDI   
Argentina  3.63***  4.70*** 
Belarus  -0.44  8.93*** 
Belgium  7.99***  6.03*** 
Bolivia  9.59***  0.97 
Botswana  -0.15  12.96*** 
Brazil  1.26  8.44*** 
Bulgaria  5.78***  4.10*** 
Cameroon  2.74***  4.22*** 
Chile  3.61***  11.75*** 
China  0.45  8.35*** 
Colombia  1.94*  7.77*** 
Costa Rica   0.76                9.95*** 
Ecuador  4.86***  3.31*** 
Egypt  3.07***  6.04*** 
Estonia  4.91***  7.79*** 
Ghana  2.19**  7.25*** 
Guatemala  1.70*  5.94*** 
Hungary  5.14***  6.69*** 
Indonesia  1.13  4.14*** 
India  -0.65  8.07*** 
Jamaica  7.73***  3.51*** 
Jordan  5.97***  5.62*** 
Kenya  -0.04  5.40*** 
Malaysia  3.34***  7.75*** 
Mexico  2.02**  7.51*** 
Namibia  3.43***  8.13*** 
Nicaragua  6.39***  2.94*** 
Pakistan  0.83  5.35*** 
Paraguay  2.56**  4.26*** 
Peru  0.93  8.93*** 
Philippines  1.66*  6.39*** 
Poland  2.09**  7.81*** 
Romania  2.66***  6.00*** 
South Africa  1.94*  9.99*** 
El Salvador  1.26  9.00*** 
Senegal  -0.76  8.42*** 
Tunisia  6.13***  6.08*** 
Turkey  0.09  8.47*** 
Uganda  2.84***  4.84*** 
Ukraine  2.11**  5.11*** 
Uruguay  -0.20  14.25*** 
Venezuela  5.00***  3.12*** 
Note: ***,**  and * indicates significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level of testing, respectively. 






Table 3a: Non-Linear Causality Results: Dependent Variable (CO) 
Causal Variable  Lags  Coefficient  t-statistic 
FDI  1  0.168  28.38*** 
FDI
2  2  -0.001  -12.42*** 
FDI
3  3  0.00026             3.70 
ln(FDI)  1  -0.13  -5.86*** 
ln(FDI)
2  1  0.0009  1.15 
ln(FDI)
3  1  -0.0004  -1.09* 
 
Table 3b: Non-Linear Causality Results: Dependent Variable (FDI) 
Causal Variable  Lags  Coefficient  t-statistic 
CO  1  5.84  5.22*** 
CO
2  2  0.77              2.10** 
CO
3  3  -0.03  -0.98 
ln(CO)  1  3.95  0.86 
ln(CO)
2  1  -0.23  -0.04 
ln(CO)
3  1  -1.62    -0.38 






























Table 4: Heterogeneous Granger Non-Linear Causality Tests 
Country  FDI CO    CO FDI   
Argentina  1.90*  0.04 
Belarus  -1.92*  8.08*** 
Belgium  4.16***  4.79*** 
Bolivia  6.34***  -2.94*** 
Botswana  -2.73***  9.69*** 
Brazil  -0.43  4.81*** 
Bulgaria  3.64***  1.08 
Cameroon  1.30  0.49 
Chile  0.26  6.05*** 
China  -0.99  5.44*** 
Colombia  -0.04  4.19*** 
Costa Rica   -0.90  6.35*** 
Ecuador  2.38**  -2.00** 
Egypt  1.27  1.43 
Estonia  2.44**  3.86*** 
Ghana  0.51  3.05*** 
Guatemala  0.21  1.86* 
Hungary  2.51**  2.02** 
Indonesia  -0.09  3.22*** 
India  -1.51  8.45*** 
Jamaica  5.26***  -0.47 
Jordan  3.64***  3.19*** 
Kenya  -0.79  4.43*** 
Malaysia  0.37  3.06*** 
Mexico  0.41  3.29*** 
Namibia  0.722  2.81*** 
Nicaragua  4.70***  -1.90 
Pakistan  -0.18  3.92*** 
Paraguay  1.11  0.43 
Peru  -0.49  4.87*** 
Philippines  -0.14  2.11*** 
Poland  0.51  3.49*** 
Romania  1.32  2.29*** 
South Africa  -0.13  5.17*** 
El Salvador  -0.36  5.46*** 
Senegal  -1.95*  9.02*** 
Tunisia  3.05***  1.45 
Turkey  -1.07  7.63*** 
Uganda  1.60  1.05 
Ukraine  0.90  2.15** 
Uruguay  -2.15**  13.83*** 
Venezuela  2.85***  -1.95* 
Note: ***,**  and * indicates significance at the 1,5 and 10 percent level of testing, respectively. 





4.  Conclusion 
This paper determines the causal link between FDI and corruption in 42 developing countries 
using granger causality linear and non linear panel methods over the period 1998 to 2009. The 
findings show that the outcome of the causal association depends on the method used. The linear 
panel  methods  revealed  that  the  majority  of  the  markets  indicate  a  bidirectional  causal  link 
between  FDI and corruption while  in contrast, for the  nonlinear tests, the  link  from  FDI to 
corruption dominates.  
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND CORRUPTION IN 
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES: EVIDENCE FROM GRANGER 
LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR PANEL CAUSALITY TESTS  
Allan S.Wright and Roland Craigwell 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims at determining the Granger causal relationship between FDI and corruption in 42 
developing countries using linear and non linear panel methods over the period 1998 to 2009. 
The findings show a causal association as corruption appears to Granger caused FDI and FDI 
seems to Granger lead corruption using linear methods, while for weaker results are obtain using 
non linear methods. The general value of these results is that adequate institutional facilities must 
be in place in developing economies to reduce losses from corruption especially in an attempt to 
attract foreign direct investment.  
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